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The  globalisation  of  relations  between  stock  markets,  issuers  of  shares  and 
investors, has led to frequent reviews of national rules and regulations, by routes 
that  are  consistent  with  the  culture,  traditions  and  market  conditions  of  each 
country.  In  fact,  generally  accepted  principles  of  effectiveness  of  corporate 
governance  have  taken  hold  in  the  context  of  different  models  of  governance, 
whose implementation is also linked to the share structure of the companies and 
the dynamics of risk capital markets. 
In listed companies, a capital market orientation is conditioned by the dominance 
of an insider or outsider system, by the parties that appoint the governance organs 
(only the owners in Anglo-Saxon countries and most industrialised countries; the 
owners and employees in Germany and generally in the so-called ‘Rhenish’ model) 
and by the stakeholder that are represented in the administrative and supervisory 
organs. 
The expansion of relations between stock markets, the growth of parallel trading 
platforms  and  the  spread  of  ICT  certainly  emphasises  the  relief  of  correct 
development of the administrative and supervisory activities typical of corporate 
governance,  but  it  also underlines the importance of effective external controls 
(auditing  carried  out  by  the  stock  markets  and  by  specific  institutions),  and 
consistent,  transparent  behaviour,  associated  with  clear,  verifiable  and  truthful 
communications. 
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1. Corporate Governance in Global Markets 
 
In a global market, barriers of space and time to the circulation of information, 
assets and resources tend to disappear, while the inter-dependence of the conditions 
for the economic, competitive and social success of any business becomes stronger. 
                                                 






Edited by: ISTEI - University of Milan-Bicocca                                                        ISSN: 1593-0319 
 
14 
The globalisation of the markets and of information has a significant influence on 
corporate governance, because of the growing importance of attributing value to 
stakeholders’  expectations  by  the  creation of virtual cycles of resources, assets, 
results and consensus, the multiplication of risk factors, and the increase of direct 
and indirect relations between operating units and markets
1.  
The tendency to set up increasingly broad and complex networks of relations has 
the  effect  of  underlining,  on  one  hand,  the  importance  of  market-driven 
management with reference to all areas of negotiation, and on the other, attention to 
the  effectiveness,  flexibility  and  convergence  of  the  principles  and  models  of 
corporate governance.  
A market-driven approach is in fact ingrained in corporate governance, in view of 
the fact that: the mandate to govern is granted by the shareholders – possibly with 
the participation of employees and banks – and correctly exercised in favour of the 
company’s  main  interlocutors;  standards  and  recommendations  regarding 
administrative, auditing and communications structures and processes are drawn up 
to  safeguard  third  parties;  corporate  administration  and  control  presuppose 
safeguarding the potential for success, from which the optimisation of the capacity 
to create value in time derives. 
Correct  behaviour  and  the  skills  developed  to  understand  the  markets  and 
emerging opportunity, to create effective IT systems and take decisions based on 
the  judicious  identification  of  perspective  risks,  to  anticipate  the  moves  of  the 
competition, and to establish high profile relationships in the markets on which 
they  operate,  are  phenomena  that  can  decree  the  success  of  businesses  in  their 
current operating conditions
2. 
The  complexity  of  the  relationships  that  are  essential  for  value  creation 
underlines the links between the capacity to optimise economic and competitive 
performance, and the correct assumption of responsibility before all the relevant 
players  and  the  environment.  The  establishment  of  joint-stock  companies,  the 
consequent, at least partial, separation between ownership and management and, to 
a greater extent, listing on the stock exchange, make it particularly important to 
protect the shareholders, who risk the financial resources they contribute and may 
condition the trend of the company’s market value. 
Globalisation and the fierce competition that listed companies come up against to 
acquire consensus from the parties who underwrite shares in their capital, have 
without doubt determined a clear competitive approach to the stock market. The 
link  between  results  achieved,  the  capacity  to  meet  perceived  expectations,  the 
demand/supply of company stock and the relative market value, has increased in 
importance thanks to the success of corporate governance. 
A company’s market value is conditioned by numerous factors, inside and outside 
the  company.  The  external  factors  include  general  economic  phenomena  (for 
example, interest rates, inflation, unemployment, exchange rates, the credit capital 
market, etc.), political relations between countries, the state of development and the 
transparency of the markets they are listed on, the degree of recourse to parallel 
markets,  the  manifestation  of  states  of  insolvency,  scandals  and  cases  of  bad 
corporate  management,  communications  by  the  competition,  by  commercial 
interlocutors,  by  organisations  and  institutions,  and  increased  speculation  by 
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the results achieved and the conditions that distinguish the evolution of activities 
(for example, the structure of a company and the geographical areas in which it 
operates, its supply markets, relations with the workforce and the trades unions, 
capital  spending,  selling  markets,  supply  agreements  and  developments  in  the 
sectors where client companies operate, etc). 
What  is  more,  the  collapse  of  space  and  time  barriers  to  the  spread  of 
information, the growing importance of institutional investors and the role played 
by financial analysts are all phenomena that boost competition to obtain resources, 
emphasising  the  need  for  transparency  and  to  maintain  trust  and  consensus 
regarding company operations. 
For listed companies, we therefore note a market-driven approach to the capital 
market, both because it is a primary sources of resources, and with regard to the 
importance of the ratio between the demand and supply of capital shares to assert 
the corporate value and to express consensus regarding the work of governance 
organs. 
The  characteristics  of  the  listing  markets  and  the  degree  of  dispersion  of 
companies’  capital  stock  do  tend  to  emphasise  different  levels  of  market 
orientation,  which  appear  to  be  linked  to  the  models  of  corporate  governance 
adopted,  to  certain  conditions  that  regulate  the  mandate  received,  and  to  how 
governance is exercised. 
The importance of relations with the stockholders also lies behind the legislative 
measures  and  recommendations  designed  to  guarantee  the  effectiveness  of 
corporate governance. At the same time, the gradual integration of the major capital 
markets seems to stimulate the striving for flexibility and the convergence of the 
principles and models of governance. 
The attention of legislators and the institutions has focused in particular on joint-
stock companies and, in this context, on listed companies, in view of the scope of 
the  interests  involved  and  the  priority  role  that  corporate  governance  plays  in 
safeguarding the effectiveness of market relations. 
The  globalisation  of  relations  between  stock  markets,  issuers  of  shares  and 
investors, has therefore led to frequent reviews of national rules and regulations, by 
routes that are consistent with the culture, traditions and market conditions of each 
country,  but  also  aim  to  apply  international  best  practices.  In  fact,  generally 
accepted principles of effectiveness of corporate governance have taken hold in the 
context of different models of governance, whose implementation is also linked to 
the share structure of the companies and the dynamics of risk capital markets. 
 
 
2. The Spread of Models of Corporate Governance 
 
The models of corporate governance recognised around the world are based on the 
relationship  between  the  stockholders  and  organisms  created  to  implement 
governance  activities  (administration/management,  control).  In  this  regard,  the 
standard  models  are  based  on:  the  possible  separation  of  administrative  and 
supervisory organs that have a mandate to govern, to distinguish between one-tier 
systems (i.e. with a single governance organ) and two-tier or dual systems (i.e. that 
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administrative and supervisory activities of corporate governance); delegation in the 
process to appoint specific members of the governance organs, so as to distinguish 
between horizontal two-tier models (in which both the administrative organ and the 
supervisory organ are appointed by the stockholders) and vertical two-tier models (in 
which the stockholders – sometimes with the participation of employees – appoint 
the supervisory organ, which in turn appoints the administrative organ). 
The main industrialised countries currently break down (Table 1) into countries 
that adopt a single model of corporate governance, countries where it is possible to 
choose between one-tier and two-tier models, and countries that give priority to 
models based exclusively on the mandate for administration (pure one-tier model 
adopted in the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Spain, Greece, etc.), in 
other words countries that highlight the supervisory role of corporate governance 
by  combining  the  administrative  organ  and  a  supervisory  organism  (two-tier 
models but even some one-tier models that envisage a specific supervisory organ 
that acts autonomously). 
 











United States  x      
United Kingdom  x      
Ireland  x      
Canada  x      
Greece  x     
Spain  x     
Sweden  x     
Germany     x   
Austria      x   
Denmark      x   
Italy   x  x  x 
Luxembourg  x  x   
Netherlands  x  x  x 
Norway  x  x   
Finland  x  x   
Japan  x    x 
France  x  x   
Belgium  x  x   
Portugal  x  x  x 
Russia  x  x  x 
 
 
In  recent  years,  there  have  been  changes  to  legislation  and  to  the  rules  and 
regulations of corporate governance in several countries. Prompted by the scale of 
the interests involved and the role of national stock markets in the development of 
a  country’s  economy,  self-regulation  codes  have  also  been  drafted,  designed  to 
adapt the conditions of transparency and effectiveness of listed companies to the 
new competitive requirements imposed by globalisation (Table 2). 
Evolutions  in  corporate  governance  underline  the  growing  potential  for 
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number of countries where it is possible to opt for different models of governance, 
and  greater  attention  to  control  and  communications  undertaken  to  protect  the 
stockholders and other stakeholders. 
In  Italy,  for  example,  the  2003  reform  of  company  law  (the  Vietti  Reform, 
effective  from  2004)  combines  a  traditional  or  horizontal  two-tier  model  with 
vertical two-tier and one-tier models. The alternatives contemplated by legislators 
envisage the coexistence of two organs: one dedicated primarily to administration 
(board of directors or management board), the other with control functions (board 
of auditors, supervisory board, management control committee)
3. 
 








INSTITUTIONS PROMOTING THE CODE 





  Several organisms (London Stock Exchange, 
Financial Reporting Council, Confederation of 
British Industry, Institute of Directors, 
professional accountants) jointly promoted the 
creation of numerous committees. 
  1992    Cadbury committee 
  1995    Greenbury committee 
  1998    Hampel committee 
  1998  2000, 
2003, 
2005, 2006 
Turnbull, Smith and Higgs committees, whose 
work is collected in the Combined Code 
Ireland   1992 – 
2006 
  Adopts the same codes as the United Kingdom 
Canada  1994    Toronto Stock Exchange 
  2001    Saucier Committee, promoted by the Toronto 
Stock Exchange and the Board of Chartered 
Accountants 
France      Several organisms (Paris Stock Exchange, 
National Council of French Employers, business 
associations) have jointly promoted the creation 
of numerous committees. 
  1995    Viénot I committee 
  1999    Viénot II committee 
  2002    Bouton committee 
  2003    Afep – Medef work group for the consolidation of 
the previous codes 
United 
States 
1997  2002, 2005  Business Roundtable 
  2004    National Association of Corporate Directors 
(NADC) 
  2004  2007  TIAA-CREF (teachers’ pension fund) 
  1998  2005  CalPERS (retirement fund of public employees of 
California) 
  2005    The Council of Institutional Investors 
  2002    Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) 
Netherlands  1997    Peters committee, promoted by the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange 
  2004    Tabaksblat committee, promoted by the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange and numerous 
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Finland   1997  2003  Work group promoted by the Stock Exchange, 
the National Chamber of Commerce and 
business associations 
Japan   1997    Keidanren (federation of economic organisations) 
  1997  2001, 2004  Work group of the Japanese Corporate 
Governance Forum 
Belgium   1998    Entrepreneurs’ Association (VBO/FEB) 
  1998    Commission for Banks and Finance (CBFA) 
  1998    Cardon committee, promoted by the Brussels 
Stock Exchange 
  2004    Lippens committee, promoted jointly by the 
organisations issuing the codes of 1998 
Spain  1998    Olivencia committee, promoted by the 
Government 
  2003    Aldama committee, promoted by the Government 
  2006    Work group proposed by Comisión Nacional del 
Mercado de Valores (CNMV) and approved by 
the Ministry for the Economy, to prepare the 
Combined Code 
Italia  1999  2002  Preda committee, promoted by Borsa Italiana spa 
  2006    Capuano committee, promoted by Borsa Italiana 
spa 
Portugal   1999  2003, 2007  Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários 
(CMVM) 
Greece   1999    Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC) 
Denmark   2001  2005  Nørby committee, promoted by the Copenhagen 
Stock Exchange 
Germany  2002  Annual  Cromme commission, appointed by the Ministry 
of Justice 
Austria   2002  Annual  Work group promoted by the Vienna Stock 
Exchange, the Ministry of Finance, financial 
business associations and professional 
accountants 
Russia   2002    Federal Commission for Securities Market 
  2002    The Russian Corporate Governance Roundtable 
  2004    International Finance Corporation, with the 
agreement of the U.S. Department of Commerce 
Norway   2004  Annual  Oslo Stock Exchange and numerous 
associations of businesses, investors and 
financial analysts 
Sweden   2005    Committee promoted by the Government, the 
Stock Exchange and businesses 
Luxem-
bourg  
2006    Luxembourg Stock Exchange 
 
However, dominant culture and habits tend to determine a net preponderance of 
models that are rooted in companies (95.61% of the cases noted) (Table 3). In fact, 
four years after the reform, the spread of the vertical two-tier model (3.04% of the 
cases noted) and the one-tier model (1.35% of the cases listed) is still very limited, 
revealing resistance to change, except in the presence of extraordinary events that 
already envisage changes to governance structures
5. 
In the various countries, the behaviour of businesses does however appear to be 
directed  at  improving  their  corporate  governance,  by  exploiting  their  acquired 
capabilities  and  skills,  rather  than  at  evaluating  opportunities  to  change  their 
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Vertical two-tier  One-tier  Total* 
283  9  4  296 
 




3. Models of Corporate Governance and Stock Markets 
 
The  models,  standards  and  operating  recommendations  adopted  in  different 
countries and the level of market-driven management of listed companies, reveal 
links  with  the  characteristics  of  the  financial  markets  and  the  degree  of 
concentration of ownership. In this regard, we note: 
-  countries in which corporate governance is significantly oriented to the risk 
capital market, in view of the role of control/consensus associated with stock 
demand trends and the confirmation of governance mandates by stockholders 
(outsider system or market oriented system);  
-  countries in which the characteristics of the stock market tend to limit its 
regulatory  role,  in  relation  to  the  existence  of  corporate  stockholder 
structures and stock negotiation conditions that make it difficult to exercise 
effective control over governance (insider system). 
 
Outsider systems are characterised by the dominance of large listed companies 
with very fragmented, widespread ownership (public companies), typical of Anglo-
Saxon  countries.  In  the  presence  of  truthful,  correct  and  transparent 
communications,  the  efficient  functioning  of  the  capital  market  determines 
consensus/control of administrative activities, and variations in stock values due to 
the dynamics of demand and supply of shares of ownership. 
The model that dominates in outsider systems is usually of the one-tier type, with 
governing organs that have a short mandate and a high degree of independence. In 
these situations, it is the market that exercises control over corporate governance 
directly  on  the  basis  of  information  received  about  behaviour  and  actual  and 
forecast results. Economic communications therefore take on greater significance, 
as does the role of external controls to audit financial statements. 
Outsider systems presuppose well developed stock markets with a high potential 
to attract resources, and clear possibilities to shift investments from one stock to 
another on the basis of available information about corporate governance and the 
related  results,  and  with  significant  intervention  on  the  part  of  institutional 
investors who act as market facilitators. In this context, investors are not involved 
in  management  and  they  attribute  importance  to  corporate  profitability,  to  the 
dividend distributed, and to the potential for their investment to grow in value
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For example, analysis of the ten most capitalised companies in the United States 
(Table 4), a country with an outsider system, reveals the high frequency of annual 
mandates (9 cases out of 10), large governance organs with 10 to 17 members, and 
a  net  preference  for  independent  members.  The  fragmentation  of  the  capital 
determines a separation between ownership and administration, with Boards made 
up primarily of members who are potentially equidistant from all the stakeholders, 
while  the  adoption  of  safeguards  designed  to  guarantee  transparency  and 
effectiveness  in  relation  to  possible  conflicts  of  interest  between  stockholders, 
management and other stakeholders, is essential, as well as short mandates. 
The  connection  between  the  dispersion  of  capital  and  market  relations  is 
particularly clear if we take the case of the large U.S. retail chain Wal-Mart Stores 
(the sixth U.S. company in terms of capitalisation). Wal-Mart Stores differs from 
the other nine companies considered for the breakdown of its stockholder structure 
which determines a different approach to governance: the Walton family holds over 
40% of capital stock and is the major stockholder; the Board of Directors has 15 
members, only two of whom are executive; two directors belong to the Walton 
family and one of them is the executive Chairman; the length of the mandate to the 
governance organ is five years, decidedly longer than most public companies. 
 
Table 4: Corporate Governance. Structure of Organs and Length of Mandate 
(U.S.A.; First Ten Listed Companies; 31-12-2007) 
 




Insider systems are typical of countries like Italy and most European countries, 
























MOBIL  292,860.37   12  1  0  11  1 
GENERAL 
ELECTRIC  211,005.15   16  2  2  12  1 
MICROSOFT  164,308.76   10  2  0  8  1 
AT&T  134,333.25  16  1  0  15  1 
PROCTER & 
GAMBLE  128,877.45   13  1  0  12  1 – 3* 
WAL-MART 
STORES  124,588.77   15  2  2  11  5 
CHEVRON 
CORP  115,763.44  14  2  0  12  1 
JOHNSON & 
JOHNSON  112,268.96   12  2  0  10  1 
BANK OF 
AMERICA  104,724.38   17  1  1  15  1 
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structure,  with  blockholders  involved  in  management  and  in  any  case  able  to 
influence corporate decisions. In this context, stakeholders’ interests are primarily 
safeguarded by the effectiveness of the control exercised by corporate governance, 
and  two-tier systems are important; there are however countries like Spain and 
Greece, that envisage the use of the one-tier system alone, for which we should 
make a clear distinction between the administrative and the supervisory functions 
of corporate governance. 
In  insider  systems  a  market-driven  approach  to  the  stock  market  is  basically 
defined by the will to maintain a high value of stock and, very often, it may also be 
influenced by AGM resolutions to authorise the purchase of treasury stock. 
In  countries  with  insider  systems,  mandates  for  corporate  governance  are 
attributed in numerous ways, due to historical, economic and cultural factors. For 
example, we might find: 
-  systems  in  which  the  mandate  for  corporate  governance  is  attributed 
exclusively  to  the  owners,  generally  with  the  strong  involvement  of  the 
majority stockholder (a Latin insider system);  
-  systems characterised by the active involvement of employees (a ‘Rhenish’ 
insider system). 
 
The first group includes countries, like Italy, where the economic risk of investment in 
the capital stock is evident. The capital market orientation is therefore emphasised in 
relation to the role attributed to the stockholders, as the exclusive principal from which 
the  administrative  and/or  controlling  function  of  corporate  governance  issues.  The 
mandate may also be expressed directly or indirectly by the stockholders, depending 
whether a horizontal two-tier system (the AGM appoints the Board of Directors and 
Board of Auditors), a vertical two-tier system (the AGM appoints the supervisory board 
which in turn appoints the management committee), or a one-tier system (the AGM 
appoints the Board of Directors which appoints the Management Control Committee 
from among its members) is adopted.  
The presence of one or more majority stockholders and the possible existence of 
stockholders’ agreements tend in any case to condition the market orientation, which is 
often purely formal, in other words, bound by standards and recommendations. This 
phenomenon reflects on the characteristics of the corporate governance systems, in 
terms of the models chosen and the composition and length of the mandate. 
For  example,  analysis  of  the  corporate  governance  systems  of  the  ten  most 
capitalised  Italian  companies  (Table  5)  reveals:  the  net  prevalence  of  two-tier 
systems; two cases of a vertical two-tier system, both within the credit sector and 
with recent changes to the corporate structure; the constant length of the mandate
8. 
Germanic  insider  systems,  on  the  other  hand,  attribute  importance  to  all  the 
contributors of primary resources (capital and labour), thus emphasising the role of 
employees and the relation between governance, employees and trades unions. In 
this  case,  the  orientation  tends  to  balance  relations  with  the  capital  and  labour 
markets,  thus  also  underlining  the  role  of  the  banks  which  are  part  of  the 
stockholder structure, as well as granting loans with interest. 
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Table 5: Corporate Governance. Structure of Organs and Length of Mandate 




























ENI  93,525.1       x  9  5+2*  3 
UNICREDIT  64,693.8       x  23  5+2*  3 
INTESA 
SANPAOLO  55,952.7     x    11  19  3 
ENEL  43,576.4       x  9  3+2*  3 
GENERALI  39,992.1       x  20  3+2*  3 
TELECOM 
ITALIA  29,629.0       x  17  5+2*  3 
FIAT  16,788.5       x  15  5+2*  3 
SAIPEM  12,174.1       x  9  3+2*  3 
ATLANTIA  11,885.8       x  15  5+2*  3 
MEDIO-
BANCA  10,205.9     x    6  21  3 
* Regular members plus substitute members 
 
For  example,  if  we  consider  the  ten  most  highly  capitalised  companies  in 
Germany (Table 6) we can see that the owners and employees are on a par when it 
comes to appointing the members of the supervisory board
9. 
 
Table 6: Corporate Governance. Structure of Organs and Length of Mandate 
















E.ON AG  81,240.6   20  10  10  ND 
SIEMENS  78,136.9   20  10  10  5 years 
DAIMLER  55,652.3   20  10  10  ND 
VOLKSWAGEN  54,389.9   20  10  10  5 years 
DEUTSCHE 
TELEKOM  53,862.0  20  10  10  ND 
ALLIANZ SE  52,235.4  12  6  6  5 years 
RWE ST  43,522.8   20  10  10  ND 
BASF  40,135.3   12  6  6  ND 
SAP AG  39,431.6   16  8  8  ND 
DEUTSCHE BK  38,713.9   20  10  10  ND 
 
Germanic insider systems seem to attribute importance to the link between the 
capacity  to  create  value  for  the  stockholder  and  organisational  behaviour, 
emphasising the coordination between top management and employees to optimise 
relations between resources, activities and results. 
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4.  Corporate  Governance  and  Market-Driven  Orientation  to  the  Capital 
Market 
 
As  we  have  seen,  globalisation  –  accompanied  by  a  gradual  reduction  in  the 
diversity of spatial environments, culture, ICT systems, traditions and institutions – 
and  the  increase  in  the  number  and  importance  of  international  regulatory 
organisms, reveal a trend towards the harmonisation of corporate governance on a 
global level on one hand, while on the other they underline the differences existing 
in  the  various  countries,  particularly  where  listed  companies,  the  different 
characteristics of the stock markets and the composition of corporate stockholder 
structures are concerned. 
The tendency to fragment ownership, the affirmation of institutional investors 
and the separation of ownership and management, underline the growing need to 
safeguard contributors of risk capital and the importance of focusing ever greater 
attention on capital markets. In this context, however, we must distinguish between 
situations where there is a strong dependence on the capacity to attract capital, and 
those in which market consensus, although important, is usually combined with the 
presence of one or more majority stockholders. 
In listed companies, a capital market orientation is conditioned by the dominance 
of an insider or outsider system, by the parties that appoint the governance organs 
(only the owners in Anglo-Saxon countries and most industrialised countries; the 
owners and employees in Germany and generally in the so-called ‘Rhenish’ model) 
and by the stakeholder that are represented in the administrative and supervisory 
organs. 
A capital market orientation is without doubt more marked in an outsider system, 
in view of the dispersion of the stockholder structure and the potential for growth 
that the market offers. Companies compete to acquire financial resources that can 
decree  their  capacity  for  growth  and  success  in  their  environment,  while  the 
market’s efficiency and appeal for investors tend to decree corporate capitalisation. 
This is reflected on the models of governance and the variables that help to avoid 
conflicts of interest between owners and directors. In particular, if the capacity to 
attract market resources remains the same, then transparency and the achievement 
of  results  that  meet  the  potential  expectations  of  investors  better  than  other 
operators acquire greater significance. 
Insider  systems,  on  the  other  hand,  are  generally affected by the existence of 
blockholders that can generate unbalanced governance systems in the absence of 
particular  standards  to  safeguard  minority  and/or  other  significant  classes  of 
stakeholder; this makes it necessary to underline the importance of control, in its 
dual role of dedicated organ and the composition of the administrative organ (for 
example, by appointing representatives of minority interests, and non-executive and 
independent members). 
The  different  role  that  the  market  has  acquired  over  the  years  in  insider  and 
outside  systems  is  reflected  in  the  different  capitalisation  values  of  listed 
companies. For example, analysis of the data set out in the previous tables reveals 
that the first ten U.S. companies have a higher capitalisation value than their Italian 
or German counterparts (Graph 1). At the end of fine 2007, the first Italian and 






Edited by: ISTEI - University of Milan-Bicocca                                                        ISSN: 1593-0319 
 
24 
American company; the capitalisation of the first U.S. company was more than 
68% higher than that of the first Italian company, and more than 72% higher than 
the first German company. 
The diversity between insider and outsider systems is however attenuated by the 
globalisation of the markets and of information, which entails the implementation 
of strategies to integrate the various national stock markets, increasingly frequent 
movements of investors from one market to another on the basis of considerations 
of  convenience  and  risk  limitation,  the  global  impact  of  phenomena  of  evident 
economic significance originating in specific geographical areas and markets, and 
the growth of so-called ‘off-exchange operations
10. 
From  the  mid  1990s,  a  number  of  international  alliances  took  place  between 
financial  market  operators,  through  the  implementation  of  different  strategies, 
which can be attributed primarily to: network strategies, based on collaboration 
agreements involving several stock exchanges in what is essentially a federative 
project;  investment  strategies  that  involve  stockholder  structures  and  herald 
mergers  between  stock  exchanges;  and  segmentation  strategies  centred  on  the 
activation of market segments designed to incorporate foreign stock (for example, 
the MTA International segment created by Borsa Italiana in 2006). 
In the early years of this century, the removal of space and time barriers has 
produced increasingly frequent shifts of capital from one stock market to another, 
particularly by institutional investors. In this regard, we only have to think that at 
the end of September 2007, the portfolios of the first ten U.S. investment funds 
included significant investments (i.e. above 2% of the capital) in companies listed 
on the Milan stock market for over ten billion dollars. 
And finally, the spread of information – with specific reference to situations and 
variables regarding crises and scandals of great economic significance – acquires 
global  significance,  conditioning  the  market  dynamics  of  all  the  industrialised 
countries, in the face of threatened risks and changes to relationships of trust and 
consensus between issuer, stock exchange and investor. What is more, the spread 
of this information is often also associated with speculative behaviour, capable of 
disrupting stock market trends. 
These  phenomena  seem  to  expand  the  reference  scenarios,  increasing  the 
importance of information and risk management systems, while they attenuate the 
different market orientation of corporate governance between insider and outsider 
systems. 
Corporate  governance  is  directed  at  guaranteeing  the  long-term  pursuit  of the 
company’s own mission, in conditions of economy and sustainable development. 
The related realisation is based on decisions, whose implementation implies that 
relations  with  different  interlocutors  and  their  expectations  be  taken  into 
consideration,  to  define  compatible  times  and  means  of  satisfaction  that  are 
compatible  with  the  internal  and  external  dynamics,  so  as  to  guarantee  the 
acquisition  of  consensus  and  trust.  In  this  regard,  establishing  effective 
relationships with contributors of risk capital is of primary importance and, for 
listed  companies,  must  take  into  account  the  significant  variables  in  the  stock 
market where they are listed, the other operators that they compete with to acquire 
capital,  investors’  expectations  and  the  existence  of  possible  facilitators  and/or 
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The expansion of relations between stock markets, the growth of parallel trading 
platforms and the spread of ICT certainly underline the need for a global approach 
to  the  acquisition  of  consensus  and  financial  resources,  necessary  directed  at 
improving the competitiveness of the market, to increase the value of the company 
and  maintain  opportune  capabilities  to  raise  stock  value.  This  emphasises  the 
correct  development  of  the  administrative  and  supervisory  activities  typical  of 
corporate governance, but it also underlines the importance of effective external 
controls (auditing carried out by the stock markets and by specific institutions), and 
consistent,  transparent  behaviour,  associated  with  clear,  verifiable  and  truthful 
communications. 
The  recent  corporate  crises,  which  first  appeared  in  countries  with  outsider 
systems (for example, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the salvage operations 
of the U.S. companies Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG, and of 
British bank Northern Rock, etc.) appear to highlight the limits potentially inherent 
in the excessive transfer of this control to the market, questioning the validity of 
pure one-tier models of corporate governance. 
 
Graph  1:  Capitalisation  Values  (U.S.A.,  Italy,  Germany;  First  Ten  Listed 
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Notes 
 
1 In this regard it is sufficient to mention the global financial crisis that exploded in 2007/2008 and 
is still ongoing. It is currently difficult to undertake an exhaustive, comprehensive analysis of the 
present  crisis  and  the  extent  of  its  implications,  although  we  can  identify  the  principal  factors 
triggering it, which have produced unprecedented losses, failures and salvage operations, primarily 
of financial institutions (for example, the well-known cases: New Century Financial, Northern Rock, 
IKB,  Bear  Stearns,  ABN  Financial,  Roskilde  Bank,  First  Integrity  Bank,  First  Heritage  and 
FirstNational Bank, IndyMac, Silver State Bank, Fanny Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, AIG, 
Merryl Lynch, Bradford & Bingley, Fortis, Hypo and Dexia), high fluctuations and reductions in the 
market value of listed companies all over the world, the widespread risk of recession, and the need 
for a worldwide review of the financial market surveillance system. The factor at the origin of the 
current global economic situation can be attributed to the subprime crisis which, because of the 
globalisation of the markets, has involved the world’s entire economic system, with different effects 
but  such  as  to  influence  all  companies  present  on  the  various  markets.  The  crisis  factors  have 
revealed the deficiencies in the risk management system, in efforts to monitor the credit market, in 
the  transparency  underlying  trading  operations,  in  the  corporate  governance  systems  of  credit 
institutes and in related internal control functions. 
2 With regard to the ability to understand the markets, we refer you to: G.S. Day, Market-Driven 
Winners,  in  S.M.  Brondoni  (ed.)  [2007],  Market-driven  management,  concorrenza  e  mercati 
globali, G. Giappichelli, Turin. 
3 The approach is founded in Italian tradition, based on the mandate of the stockholders and the 
separation between the administrative and supervisory activities of corporate governance, but also in 
the characteristics of the financial market and the degree of concentration of corporate ownership. 
4 Source: L. Bosetti, Le variabili rilevanti dei sistemi di corporate governance, in Daniela M. 
Salvioni (ed.), Corporate governance, controllo e trasparenza, FrancoAngeli, Milan, 2007 
5 In this regard, suffice it to mention the well-known cases of the adoption of the vertical two-tier 
system after the Intesa-SanPaolo merger, or that between AEM Milano and ASM Brescia. 
6 For example, the last version of the Borsa Italiana code of self-regulation (2006) focuses on the 
traditional model (horizontal two-tier) of corporate governance and only extends its considerations, 
albeit significant, to the new vertical and one-tier models in the final part. 
7 L. Van den Berghe [2002], Corporate Governance in a Globalising World: Convergence or 
Divergence?, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, p. 10. 
8 We mention the listed companies that have adopted alternative models of corporate governance 
according to official Borsa Italiana data on 29/05/08. 
-  Vertical two-tier model: Banco Popolare Società Cooperativa (S&P - blue chip); Intesa San 
Paolo  S.p.A.  (S&P  -  blue  chip);  Management  &  Capitali  S.p.A.  (MTF3  –  Funds  Market); 
Mediobanca  S.p.A.  (S&P  –  blue  chip);  Mid  Industry  Capital  (MTF3  –  Funds  Market);  Monti 
Ascensori S.p.A. (Expandi); S. S. Lazio S.p.A. (Standard); Unione Banche Italiane S.c.p.A. (S&P - 
blue chip); A2A S.p.A. (blue chip). 
-  One-tier model: Buongiorno S.p.A. (Star); CHL centro distribuzione HL S.p.A. (Standard); 
Engineering (Star); Fmr-Art'e' Società internazionale arte e cultura S.p.A. (Standard). 
We also point out that some companies, including Mediobanca, that have adopted the vertical two-
tier model, are now debating whether to return to the traditional model. 
9 The choice reflects the current legal constraints in relation to the size of the workforce. What is 
more, it appears significant to underline that at least two companies (Allianz and Basf) have adopted 
the legal form of the European Company, signing up to the single model introduced in 2004. The 
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regulation of 2001 (EC Council Regulation no. 2157/2001 of 08.10.2001, which came into effect on 
08.10.2004, and Directive 2001/86/CE, with a final deadline for assimilation by member states of 
08.10.2004), and is a form of company that can be established in the territory of the European 
Union, complying with a single legal and management system rather than being subject to different 
national legislation. An SE is therefore a company established under EU law, which has its own legal 
set-up and functions as a single economic operator all over the European Union. 
10  In  this  regard,  the  European  Parliament  approved  Directive  2004/39/CE  of  April  21,  2004 
(MiFID - ‘Markets in Financial Instruments Directive’), which marks an important step towards the 
creation of an effective, competitive integrated financial market within the EU. 
The directive abolishes the obligation for concentration in regulated markets, and introduces new 
forms of trading, such as the Multilateral Trading Facility (MTF) and Systematic Internalisers. 
The assimilation of the MiFID directive was originally envisaged for April 2006, but in view of 
the substantial impact it would have on the legislation of individual Member States, the deadline for 
implementation was postponed to January 31, 2007 (directive 2006/31/CE).  
In Italy, the Financial Consolidating Law was modified by Leg. Decree no. 164 of September 17, 
2007.  Moreover,  in  October  2007  CONSOB  updated  its  secondary  regulations  (Regulation  of 
Markets and Brokers). And finally, from November 1, 2007 (the date the MiFID legislation came 
into effect) all operators were obliged to apply and respect the new regulations. One of the main 
objectives  of  MiFID  is  to  create  a  competitive,  harmonious  financial  environment for regulated 
markets and investment companies, but also to step up protection for investors, and the efficiency 
and integrity of the financial markets themselves. 
The main standards regarding the markets are: 
-  the elimination of the obligation to concentrate trading in regulated markets; 
-  the new figure of the trading venue, represented by regulated markets, multilateral trading 
facilities (MTF) and internalisers; 
-  pre-trade and post-trade transparency requirements for market information; 
-  specific arrangements for the admission of financial instruments on regulated markets; 
-  regulations for the admission of operators to the regulated markets and MTF; 
-  regulations for reporting on transactions to the competent authorities (transaction reporting); 
-  regulations applicable to clearing and settlement systems. 
It does seem advisable to point out that transaction reporting – the system by which European 
authorities began to exchange information about the continent’s listed stock – recently revealed that 
about one quarter of trading in the most widespread Italian stock takes place over the counter. 
 